THE IMPACT OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL RULES IN FACILITATING THE PUBLIC'S ACCESS TO MEDICINES IN SOUTH
Having established that that the South African Patents Act of 1978 was generally substantively compliant with TRIPS even prior to its post-TRIPS amendments, it appears that a number of amendments discussed herein appeared to seek to achieve textual compliance as they were already TRIPS-compliant. For South Africa, one of the key challenges is that accession to TRIPS appears to have diminished the country's autonomy to overhaul or amend IP legislation in line with the 1996 Constitution of the democratic South Africa that upholds the public's right to healthcare services, among other fundamental human rights.
The higher standards of IP protection entrenched in TRIPS may compromise public's access to medicines in any developing country (DC) or least developed country (LDC) that lacks institutional capacity or political will to implement compulsory licensing in the public interest whenever the public's right to access medicines is threatened by pharmaceutical patentees' abuse of patent rights.
On the other hand, the CBD appears to have positively affected the development of national law as it influenced the promulgation of the National Environmental Management Biodiversity Act (NEMBA) in 2004 and the amendment of the Patents Act in 2005 which jointly protect the rights of indigenous knowledge (IK) holders. With South Africa being the third most bio-diverse country in the world, and also having wealth of IK relating to pharmaceuticals the NEMBA and the 2005 amendment of the Patent Act have established clear rules to guard against bio-piracy. The benefit-sharing provisions of the NEMBA however appear to limit the right to benefit sharing to only a share or portion of commercialization of income realized by the bio-prospector. A suggestion is made to extend the benefit-sharing to include the right to co-own the IP in question as the portion of commercialization income that does not guarantee the public's access to the pharmaceutical products developed from IK.
It was also noted that while Bayh-Dole has positively influenced the promulgation of the Intellectual Property Rights from Publicly-Financed Research and Development Act of 2008 (IPR Act), ownership of IP by public institutions will only be meaningful for the realization of the public's right to access medicines when the public institutions owning the IP are legally obliged to utilize the IP in the public interest. Currently, public institutions may use their discretion regarding whether they should pursue revenue-driven or people-focused transactions. The IPR Act neither offers any penalty to, nor holds accountable, any public institution that prioritizes revenue over public good.
It can therefore be concluded that compliance with international IP law rules is not a silver bullet that will solve South Africa's challenges relating to access to medicines. The protection of the public's right to access to medicines in South Africa is strongly dependent on the government's political will of ensuring that IP law is implemented to serve public good and public and private pharmaceutical patent holders are held accountable regarding the socially-responsible utilization of their IP.
I INTRODUCTION
The legal standards expressed in international trade agreements, treaties and conventions to which South Africa has acceded dictate the confines within which policy makers and law makers may tread when constructing or reviewing national law and policy. Therefore, if South Africa were to overhaul its intellectual property (IP) law regime, as proposed by some scholars, 1 to enhance the public's access to patented medicines, the substance of the legal provisions giving effect to such law reforms or revised policy direction will inevitably have to be informed by the spirit of the relevant international agreements such as the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects for Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), and to some extent the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) which pays specific attention to legal issues at the interface of IP, indigenous knowledge (IK) and biodiversity.
TRIPs and the legal developments related thereto serve as both an international legal sounding board and a major instrument of analysis when dealing with the question of promoting access to essential medicines in WTO member states. The compelling evidence of the value of IK in developing pharmaceutical products from biodiversity strengthens the case for considering the role that the international legal rules in the CBD may play in improving access to patented medicines developed from indigenous genetic resources, biological resources, or IK for the people of South Africa.
However, it is also important to recognize the impact of the Paris Convention which is also an important and long-established reference point in the development of international IP law. give effect to the waiver suggested in the preceding Decision. These developments will be examined in this chapter to establish the role that they have played or can play in improving access to essential medicines within the context of a developing country such as South Africa.
The purpose of this paper is therefore to critically analyse the role played by the above, with specific focus on TRIPS, in the development and implementation of legislation and policy that seek to advance the State's efforts of improving the public's access to essential medicines in South Africa.
More importantly, this paper will further evaluate the compliance status of the South African IP law regime with international standards. Furthermore, the study considers implementation of limited exceptions and flexibilities accorded in TRIPS, which are mechanisms purposed at ensuring that exclusive rights of the patent holders do not compromise the efforts made by the State towards improving access to essential medicines for even the poorest members of the public.
based at the university or science council will be compensated must be concluded, and lastly there must a commercialization agreement concluded between the parties. 9 Section 15(4). 10 Section 56(2)(d Developing countries such as Brazil, China, India and many others had consistently played a significant role in blocking and expressly opposing the inclusion of IP in the GATT multilateral trade negotiations. However, the all or nothing model that married international trade to IP made it difficult for developing countries and least developed countries to reject WTO membership as they believed that it was essential for their international trade interests.
Indeed, TRIPS was a quid pro quo type of an agreement or a balancing act where DCs such as South Africa and LDCs were offered access to markets of the developed world in exchange of the increased levels of IP protection. 13 For South Africa, WTO membership also carried the benefit of the lifting of sanctions and re-integration into the international trade community. Such sanctions had been placed on South Africa as a result of the apartheid regime that governed South Africa through implementation of inhumane and racial laws and policies at the time TRIPS was adopted.
In addition to the minimum standards of IP protection, TRIPS also prescribes protectable subjectmatter that WTO member states must provide for in their national laws, and for dispute resolution in relation to IP rights. Although TRIPS purportedly introduced only the minimum standards which allow WTO member states to, if they so desire, provide for higher standards in their national laws, it is important to note that such minimum standards were and are still very high for most developing countries and least developed countries, as they were more in line with the standards of IP protection that existed at the time in developed countries such as the USA and the European Union.
A practical example being that many developing countries such as Argentina, Brazil, India and others did not, prior to TRIPS, provide for patenting of pharmaceutical inventions. In order to ensure that all WTO member countries gradually met the higher standards of IP protection, specific time-frames were then set for DCs, economies in transition, and LDCs by which compliance with the new and higher standards of IP protection had to be achieved. Whilst the idea of transitional arrangements might have appeared logical and considerate at the time as it purported to enable the less developed WTO member states to effect new and higher standards of IP protection over a 'reasonable' period of time, it is clear that the applicable time periods could not have been well thought out as they appear and unrealistic for many DCs and LDCs.
14 Arguably, these transitional arrangements were only pretentious and strongly appear to be some kind The apparent lack of interest displayed by many LDCs in being bound by TRIPS is not surprising given that this Agreement was concluded through coercion of the LDCs and DCs by the developed countries. 17 Several scholars have written on how economic coercion has been used in the legal transplant of the United States of America-type of IP rules, 18 and they concur that coercion was instrumental in the discussions preceding the conclusion of the TRIPS Agreement.
Sell's detailed account on the coercive character of the TRIPS Agreement summarily argues that the TRIPS Agreement has negatively affected the LDCs and DCs in relation to the public's access to medicines. 19 The developed countries strongly appear to have been the architects and consequently beneficiaries of this Agreement, whilst the less developed countries largely remain victims seeking to minimize its negative impact, thus Sell aptly remarks that: The IP norm-setting and policy-making dynamics that informed the conclusion of TRIPS did not satisfy the three requirements of representativity, as not all interested parties were represented; full information, as all the parties involved needed to have had the full information about consequences of various possible outcomes, and non-coercion, as none of the parties had to coerce any other.
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While the proponents of the incentive theory relating to the patent system advocate for strong IP laws, the weaker patent regimes in DCs such as India have positively contributed to the development of well-established generics manufacturing industries, and consequently to the lower cost of pharmaceuticals, one of the key pre-requisites for the public's improved access. With South Africa being a DC, accession to TRIPS does not appear to have been of much assistance in improving the public's access to patented medicines. However, this assertion cannot be confirmed without interrogating the extent to which the South African IP regime has evolved in compliance with TRIPS, and possibly how such evolution, if any, has advanced the cause of improving the public's access to patented medicines. The following section evaluates the level of the South African patent legislation's compliance with the TRIPS Agreement, while also examining if the current IP landscape in South Africa can really be attributed to TRIPS as the local landscape was substantially developed, even to provide for CL, prior to the adoption of the TRIPS Agreement.
III South Africa's compliance with the TRIPS Agreement: Critical Legal Provisions Relating to Pharmaceuticals Protectable subject-matter
Extending patent protection to all fields of technology, provided that the novelty, inventiveness and industrial applicability requirements are met, is one of the most revolutionary provisions of the TRIPS Agreement, 24 as it implied that DCs such as India that previously did not provide for patent protection in relation to products, including pharmaceuticals and food, had to within a specified maximum period of 10 years amend their national legislation to comply accordingly. sector, where such strategies are more prevalent, these practices may include filing patents to block competitors, or in anticipation of business interests of other parties, or extraction of maximum revenue from patent portfolio even through mechanisms such as ever-greening. 29 This may not be the intention of this legislation, but it appears that the language of the legislators may be interpreted to afford patent holders more rights than it is intended or required by the TRIPS Agreement. The result is that the public's right to access medicines thus gets undermined. That is why Visser suggests that, in the light of all the regulatory approvals and other time-consuming formalities that precede availability of patented medicines in the market, a consideration be made to increase the term of patent protection in such cases. 30 However, there is no evidence that such concession would positively influence the behaviour of pharmaceutical multinational companies, as much as there is no evidence that the current term of protection is the reason for excessive pricing of medicines.
Term of protection

Abuse of patent rights
In line with Article 30, 31 and 40(2) of the TRIPS Agreement which provide for mechanisms purposed at limiting the abuse of patent holder's private rights against the public or competitors such as manufacturers of generic medicines, sections 4, 55, 56 and 78 of the South African Patent Act similarly provide for government use and CL to ensure that the public's right to access medicines is not compromised. These provisions therefore ensure that the exclusive rights of patent holders are not absolute and should they be abused, the granting state must be able to effect corrective action that protects the public from such abuse by the patent holders. The South African Consumer Protection Act, and the Competition Act also provide for protection of the public from excessive pricing, and anti-competitive behaviour of sellers and manufacturers such as pharmaceutical companies. medicines to the market, as the generics manufacturers can rely on the patentees' clinical data that is already at the regulatory authorities' disposal.
Undisclosed information
WTO member states have an obligation in terms of
IV The influence of international standards in the evolution of South African Patent Law a) Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health
While this Declaration is often cited as a crucial international law instrument that escalated the link between IP and public health issues into international platform, there is not much that it changed regarding how WTO member states, and inevitably South Africa, dealt with public health challenges and promotion of access to medicines. This is because the substantive provisions of the Declaration are largely a re-iteration or re-affirmation 31 of the TRIPS Agreement on public access to medicines.
However, the TRIPS flexibilities offered by the Declaration are very crucial although appearing as some form of damage control instrument designed to manage the negative consequences of the adoption of the TRIPS Agreement by LDCs and DCs. The flexibilities summarily emphasize that although TRIPS was a take it or leave it package deal that introduced the higher standards of IP protection for most DCs and LDCs, its spirit still remains sensitive to the plight of DCs and LDCs particularly in so far as issues of access to medicines are concerned.
Consequently, the Declaration unequivocally attempted to clarify the WTO position that member countries were allowed to implement CL in their national laws. Although TRIPS provides for the limiting of patent holders' exclusive rights, it is only in the Doha Declaration that express reference to CL is made. WTO member states such as South Africa that had legislation that already provided for The right to implement CL does not bear much meaning for a country that lacks capacity in the form of the requisite technical and intellectual capacity and infrastructure to actually work the invention.
The fact that the mandate given to the TRIPS Council had a timeline expiring within just over a year indicated some sense of urgency that DCs and LDCs placed on the matter. It might also be argued that 
November 2003 Decision
The 2003 Decision was a progressive step towards implementation of paragraph 6 of the Declaration as it recognized the challenges faced by some countries, mainly LDCs due to lack of adequate pharmaceutical manufacturing capacity. As a result this justified the deviation from the provisions of In ensuring that this exception or waiver is not abused, the Annexure to this Decision provides a guideline on which countries may be deemed as having insufficient or no manufacturing capacity in the pharmaceutical sector.
The products to which this Decision apply are also defined 36 , the eligible importing member 37 , and exporting member. 38 The painstaking formalities of this Decision, include: the notification that the importing country must make to the TRIPS Council 39 specifying the names and expected volume of the product needed, confirm that its eligibility in terms of par 1(b) and Annex of this Decision
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, and where a medicine is patented in its jurisdiction it has granted or intends to grant a CL pursuant to Art 31 and the provisions of this Decision 41 .
This Decision also prescribes that the CL granted under this system must specify that only the amounts necessary to meet the needs of the importing country may be manufactured and that such manufactured amounts shall in whole be exported to the importing member who have notified TRIPS Council of its needs. 42 Furthermore, the said products must be clearly identified and labelled as being produced under this Decision, and that the licensee must prior to shipment post on their website information relating to quantities being supplied to each destination, and the distinguishing features of these products.
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The exporting member also has an obligation to notify TRIPS Council of the grant of the license, indicating the name and address of licensee, the products for which license has been granted, the quantities for which it has been granted, the country to which the product is to be supplied and the duration of the license. The exporting country must also indicate the website address in which the licensee has advertised the transaction.
Art 31(h)
When CL is implemented in terms of this provision, the patent holder is entitled to adequate remuneration 'in the circumstances of each case, taking into account the economic value of the authorization'.
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The South African Patents Act of 1978 also substantially complies with this requirement in that s 56(2)(d) provides as one of the grounds for granting a CL that the patent holder must have refused to grant a licence or licences, 'upon reasonable terms', to the applicant for a CL.
The 2003 Decision introduced another waiver, in addition to one relating to Art 31(f), in terms of this requirement. This waiver ensures that in cases where the patented pharmaceutical is required by a WTO member country with less or no pharmaceutical manufacturing capacity, and where such patented medicine is also patented in such a country, that the granting of a CL by both the importing and exporting country will not lead to payment of royalties or licensing fees to the patent holder by both countries.
In terms of this waiver, when the royalties have been paid by the exporting country, the obligation of importing country to pay the royalties to the patent holder in respect of the same product pursuant to
Art 31 (h) falls away. Decision by any other country and the fact that Rwanda has not attempted or shown interest in using this route again to access pharmaceuticals raises questions on its practicality.
In terms of this Decision it is only the LDCs that are granted an automatic qualification for 'eligible importing Member's status, however other countries that have established the lack or insufficiency of their capacity may be accommodated. Most importantly the sufficiency is determined only by capacity that resides outside ownership and control of the patent holders.
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The full impact of this decision will strongly be determined by the extent to which national laws allow for this waiver, and may only be effected when national laws have been changed to provide for such.
V CBD and the National Environmental Management Biodiversity Act (NEMBA)
The influence of the international legal standards entrenched in the CBD of 1992 to which South Africa has acceded, and the Nagoya Protocol of 2010 on the CBD have introduced the requirements of prior informed consent and access to fair and equitable benefit-sharing for any party interested in While the NEMBA and associated legal developments secured the right of the indigenous communities or IK holder and by extension the public to benefit from commercialization of patented medicines that are developed from IK, the right of IK holders to own the IP in question is not clearly upheld. Given the proven ability of IK holders to contribute in IP creation, 51 the law has to take into account that the IK holder's rights may be extended to ownership of the resulting IP. This will go a long way in remedying the challenges of the public's access to patented medicines. Benefiting in commercialization of patented medicines is not synonymous with, and will not ensure, access to the 50 Art 1 of the Nagoya Protocol on Access and Benefit-Sharing. 51 Rhodes University researchers worked with IK holders towards the improvement of the traditional mead known as is 'Iqhilika' by the Xhosa people.
patented medicines as the IK holders may be paid the royalties or portions of commercialization income that may still be inadequate to ensure access. However, the right to ownership or coownership will grant indigenous communities or the public greater advantage regarding access and use of the IP in question.
The influence of the US Bayh-Dole Act
As already indicated that the promulgation of the IPR Act in South Africa was strongly influenced by the US Bayh-Dole Act a question arises on the impact of this legislation to date in promoting access to medicines. Given that the IPR Act has only been effective for a period of about 5 years, there is no reported or published case where this legislation was used to realize the public's right to access medicines. However, the right of IP ownership that now vests on public R&D institutions, and the objective of this legislation towards utilization of IP emanating government-funded R&D for public good, create a promise that the State and its organs will be able to use health-related IP in the public interest, unlike the manner in which privately owned IP is used by pharmaceutical patent holders.
The provision relating to the State's walk-in rights provided in this legislation also carry a promise that IP generated from government-funded R&D will not be abused by the institutions or licensees such as private pharmaceutical companies as the State has an irrevocable right to walk-in whenever such IP is not adequately used or abused, or when the emergency needs of country relating to health, safety, or military arise. However, the non-implementation of CL and other State walk-in type of rights provided in the Patents Act raises a question on whether the South African government will ever implement the similar type of rights provided in the IPR Act.
The US government has also never implemented the walk-in rights provided in the US Bayh-Dole Act of 1980 even when called upon to do so when the public's right to access medicines was compromised in the US. This has led some scholars to conclude that the state's walk-in are mere paper tigers or provisions that carry no meaning and that are unlikely to ever be implemented, at least in the US.
Lastly, it is equally concerning that the conditions of IP commercialization set out in the IPR Act 52 are focused on regulating licensing and assignment transactions but do not decisively oblige the government-funded R&D institutions to account for not utilizing their IP in the public interest. This current situation allows the institutions to employ their discretion regarding whether they exclusively implement revenue-focused IP commercialization strategies or pursue public interest. Institutions are therefore able to, under the IPR Act regime, prioritize high-revenue transactions over deals that would 52 Ss 11 and 12.
lead to provision of medicines to the public at low cost. It is recommended that this legislation be amended to oblige institutions to give priority to public interest when commercializing or utilizing IP relating to medicines, otherwise the public good objective of the IPR Act may be compromised.
VI CONCLUSION
For many DCs and LDCs or more specifically the African countries, the TRIPS Agreement appears to have compromised the public's access to medicines by imposing very high standards of IP protection which were not compatible with most of these countries' level of innovation, available know-how and technological infrastructure. This situation could be the reason why LDCs have to date been continually seeking extension of the cut-off date for their compliance with the TRIPS Agreement.
It can be concluded that the TRIPS Agreement negatively impacted the prospects of the South African public to access patented medicines. This is because the effect of South Africa's accession to the TRIPS Agreement is that all legal reforms or policy reviews or propositions relating to IP have to be The response of the US, and other developed countries, to the s 15 c amendment appeared to be insensitive to the fact that such amendment was the first to be made by a democratically elected government in the history of South Africa.
Politically, the adoption of the TRIPS Agreement was badly-timed for South Africa as it occurred barely two weeks before the country's very first democratic elections which saw the removal of apartheid regime while ushering in an inclusive regime that prioritizes respect of human rights and a better quality of life for all. It is therefore very important to note that South Africa's accession to the TRIPS Agreement was by the apartheid government and not by a government that took interest in everyone's right to access medicines, or any form of technology or product protected by IP rights.
This legitimizes the argument that the South African IP law regime and more specifically the Patents Act of 1978 has not undergone any major review post the promulgation of the democratic Constitution of 1996, and hence the suggestion of legal review that will be informed by the current democratic regime.
Hirsch however unreasonably suggests that the government of the African National Congress was 53 Hazel Tau and others v GSK and BI.
